The liar uses the valid designations, the words, to make the unreal appear as real; he says, for example, ‘I am rich,’ when the word ‘poor’ would be the correct designation of his situation. He abuses the fixed conventions by arbitrary changes or even by reversals of the names. When he does this in a self-serving way damaging to others, then society will no longer trust him but exclude him. Thereby men do not flee from being deceived as much as from being damaged by deception: what they hate at this stage is not the deception but the bad, hostile consequences of certain kinds of deceptions. – Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”
When an honest man speaks, he says only what he believes to be true; and for the liar, it is correspondingly indispensable that he considers his statements to be false. For the bullshitter, however, all these bets are off: he is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false …. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose. – Harry G. Frankfurt, “On Bullshit”
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In a previous post, I offered a concise definition of the word hoax: “a humorous or malicious deception.” From this definition, we learn that hoaxing requires a dishonest act or statement – a concealing or misrepresentation of a more accurate state of affairs – and it gives rise to humorous and/or malicious acts, depending in part on the hoaxer herself and on the reception and interpretation of the hoax. As a ubiquitous cultural practice, hoaxing requires an element, if not several layers, of deception. As we’ll see, there is no shortage of hoaxing examples, but the motivations for and rationales behind hoaxing are numerous and complex.
Add to this the notion that people are generally fascinated by hoaxes – not to mention hearsay, gossip, urban legends, frauds, tricks, jokes, lampoons, mockery, conspiracy theories, pranks, and other sensationalist tales – and we ultimately set the stage to enter into a larger conversation about ourselves. To my mind, we are all unwittingly and perhaps uncomfortably implicated in all this because we have all, at one time or another, been on the receiving end of a lie (well-intentioned or not), an elaborate ruse or deception, a prank or practical joke (think April Fool’s Day); we’ve all served as fodder for and/or the agents of gossip; we have participated, to varying degrees, in the circulation of jokes (mass email), the re-telling of urban legends (Sasquatch), the meticulous debates surrounding conspiracy theories (JFK assassination, 9/11), not to mention the collective finger-wagging inspired by frauds (James Frey). Given this susceptibility to engage with these kinds of everyday interaction, it seems crucial that we make some attempt to decipher why exactly we encourage these activities.
Friedrich Nietzsche’s work seems as good a place as any to begin to untangle our collective motivations. In “On Truth and Lie in a Extra-Moral Sense” (1873), a posthumously published fragment, Nietzsche depicts a pretty unflattering view of the human species — our feeble human intellects, unreliable systems of knowledge, unwavering dogma, elusive searches for truth and meaning, and so on. But his diatribe against humanity is instructive in terms of thinking about how we structure our lives to realize trivial goals and inauthentic pursuits. As he argues, men [sic] are “deeply immersed in illusions and dream images,” making them perfectly comfortable to explore and abuse their “chief powers in simulation.” As a result, we strand to inherit an environment that places a premium on one’s ability to master the art of simulation; for Nietzsche, those capable of deceiving, flattering, lying, cheating, gossiping, concealing, masking, and disguising will be able to preserve themselves against other individuals.

Of course, individuals don’t readily dismiss notions of (lower-case) truth – truth does hold an important place across cultures – but they do “forever buy illusions for truth.” This is where Nietzsche’s line of thinking helps clarify our fascination with hoaxes: if we accept that simulation, deception, and lies comprise essential facets of human life, it is not the hoax itself that causes ill will, animosity, condemnation, or general disapproval. Rather, the hoax is quite simply a natural extension of our thinking, scheming selves. Deception is almost cast as a given within the realm of human interaction; the goal, then, becomes to minimize/deflect some of the “bad, hostile consequences” precipitated by deceptions. Where truth is concerned, Nietzsche suggests that our relationship to honest forms of expression is contradictory. On the one hand, we want access to truth, that is, we desire the “agreeable life-preserving consequences of truth,” but on the other hand we are often indifferent to pure knowledge and even hostile to potentially damaging and destructive truths. We want to lie and deceive, convey truth and beauty, all on our own terms. As is the case with most things, we want to have our cake and it eat it, too…
While Nietzsche’s work offers some insight into why we might simultaneously embrace and reject various hoaxing activities, it seems necessary to examine some of the finer points of deception. Let’s briefly survey the terrain of lies and lying. In This Means This, This Means That(2007), Sean Hall offers a playful entry point with this gem of a statement: That’s a good haircut. Because it’s sometimes hard to distinguish between truth and falsity, Hall considers the different inflections and modalities of speech one might attach to this kind of statement. He comes up with four different ways of thinking about “That’s a good haircut,” tracing the subtle differences between facts, values, ironies, and lies. In the first instance, “That’s a good haircut” may be factual — that haircut has been skillfully done — and the intent behind the statement is to relay the fact. You may also like your friend’s Travis Bickle-styled mohawk — in fact, you’ve always loved that style of haircut! — offering a value judgment of sorts based on what you deem fashionable and aesthetically pleasing.

For those quick to embrace their ironic sensibilities, leafing through any number of magazines, television programs, internet flaming sites should provide enough fodder for them to say the exact opposite of what they mean, tongue-firmly planted in cheek (“That’s a good [Flock of Seagulls] haircut[!]). Lastly, one may choose to lie outright for a number of reasons. If your mother/best friend/significant other asks you what you think of their new haircut and you disapprove, you choose the white lie so as to cushion any possible hurt feelings or to avoid any unnecessary friction; a malicious liar may very well mislead the recipient of a bad haircut so as to ensure that s/he will continue to parade the new hairstyle around town.
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At this point, it’s fair to ask what any of this has to do with hoaxing and deception, and I think Hall’s example illustrates the complexity of everyday interactions through a seemingly straightforward statement. Hall rightly highlights the apparent and underlying messages we share with or withhold from others, all the while shedding light on some of the motivations behind concealing and revealing the true nature of our thoughts. As he puts it, “Lies are like truths in being almost never pure and rarely simple” (46). And because truths and falsehoods often operate so interchangeably, it becomes increasingly important for people not only to understand both sides of this divide, but to develop strategies for interpreting these conflicting modes of address. Misinterpreting the phrase “I love you” can have disastrous consequences if you don’t draw the correct conclusion (i.e., buying an engagement ring based on a platonic “I love you”); the same applies for “I’m dying over here” (is this just hyperbolic rhetoric or is your best friend actually choking on a chicken bone?). Failure to correctly interpret these scenarios could have life and death implications for the parties involved (be they social or physical).
And the stakes keep getting higher: “One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit.” So begins philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt’s widely read essay “On Bullshit.” At the heart of our love of a good hoax lies a culture’s robust confidence in being able to detect bullshit and a deftness at not being taken in by it. 
But hoaxes are often referred to as “elaborate deceptions” for a reason: there is a level of detail and sophistication that creates room for misunderstanding and confusion, meaning that individuals, social groups, and communities are all potentially susceptible to falling victim to a hoax. In the event of certain hoaxes, the bullshit (deception) detector doesn’t trigger as it should. In a culture awash with bullshit, Frankfurt suggests, we should take note of two dominant figures: the liar and the bullshitter. Whereas a liar is “essentially someone who deliberately promulgates a falsehood,” the bullshitter is someone that ”is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false … he does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly.” A liar understands his relationship to truth, but chooses to express the opposite (I may know full well where your car keys are, but I want you to stay; thus, I don’t know where your keys are.) The bullshitter, on the other hand, has no regard for truth, as s/he actively chooses to express a false position in the sole interest of advancing a specific agenda. It is no wonder that Frankfurt concludes that “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are” (61).
Somewhere amidst our Nietzschean love of self-deception, our propensity to accord indeterminate meaning to things and sayings, and our love of lies and bullshit lies a satisfactory answer to why it is we champion, denounce, love, vilify, contest, and celebrate all manners of hoaxing. While I’m unable to offer a definitive theory to help better explain this phenomenon, this loosely drawn sketch should help situate the reader a bit more thoroughly to appreciate the nuances at work in contemporary hoaxing. For the purposes of this book, you don’t need to re-introduced to the unpredictable terrain of everyday human interaction (you know it all too well already!), but it will be useful to have some of these ideas in mind when we come the larger issues surrounding hoaxing, particularly with regards to The Yes Men.